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The Possibility of Reflexive Global Climate Politics  
 
Hayley Stevenson 
University of Sheffield 
 
Forthcoming in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 
 
ABSTRACT 
FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES, THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME HAS BEEN FAILING TO PRODUCE OUTCOMES 
THAT WILL GENUINELY CONFRONT THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE. RECENT YEARS HAVE SEEN GREATER POLITICAL 
WILL TO FORGE A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT AT THE 2015 PARIS SUMMIT. OPTIMISM HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY HIGH SINCE 
CHINA AND THE US REACHED A BILATERAL DEAL IN 2014. BUT IT REMAINS UNCERTAIN WHETHER A PARIS AGREEMENT 
WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY AMBITIOUS TO AVOID THE WORST EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE. PAST EXPERIENCE IN GLOBAL 
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE CAUTIONS AGAINST ASSUMING THAT ANY AGREEMENT IS A STEP FORWARD. DRAWING ON GREEN 
POLITICAL THEORY, THIS PAPER APPROACHES CLIMATE CHANGE AS PART OF A WIDER CONDITION OF UNSUSTAINABILITY. 
IT DEFINES A STANDARD OF ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY FOR MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, AND 
OUTLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF STRONG ECOLOGICAL REFLEXIVITY FOR OVERCOMING THE WEAKNESSES IN EXISTING 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE.  
 
RESUME 
DEPUIS PLUS DE VINGT ANS, LE RÉGIME POLITIQUE PROPRE À GÉRER LE CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE GLOBAL A ÉCHOUÉ À 
PRODUIRE DES RÉSULTATS À MÊME D¶AFFRONTER LA CRAINTE GÉNÉRÉE PAR CE CHANGEMENT. ON A VU APPARAÎTRE CES 
DERNIÈRES ANNÉES UNE PLUS GRANDE VOLONTÉ POLITIQUE POUR ARRIVER À UN ACCORD AU SOMMET DE PARIS EN 
2015. /¶OPTIMISME EST DEVENU PARTICULIÈREMENT FORT DEPUIS QUE LA CHINE ET LES ETATS-UNIS ONT CONCLU UN 
ACCORD BILATÉRAL EN 2014. NÉANMOINS IL RESTE INCERTAIN DE SAVOIR SI UN ACCORD SUFFISAMMENT AMBITIEUX 
SERA ATTEINT À PARIS, QUI PUISSE ÉVITER LES PIRES EFFETS DU CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE. LES EXPÉRIENCES PASSÉES 
POUR LA GOUVERNANCE GLOBALE DU CLIMAT RENDENT PRUDENT QUANT À FAIT DE PENSER QUE CHAQUE ACCORD EST 
UN PAS EN AVANT.  INSPIRÉ DE LA THÉORIE POLITIQUE VERTE, CET ARTICLE ABORDE LE CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE 
COMME UNE PARTIE D¶UN ENSEMBLE PLUS VASTE DE NON-DURABILITÉ. CE TEXTE DÉFINIT LES CRITÈRES D¶UNE 
RATIONALITÉ ÉCOLOGIQUE À MÊME DE MESURER L¶ADÉQUATION AVEC ELLE DES ACCORDS SUR LE CLIMAT. IL SOULIGNE 
L¶IMPORTANCE D¶UNE RÉFLEXIVITÉ ÉCOLOGIQUE FORTE POUR POUVOIR DÉPASSER LES FAIBLESSES DE LA 
GOUVERNANCE ACTUELLE DU CHANGEMENT DU CLIMAT GLOBAL. 
  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The mood in the lead-up to the Paris climate change summit has undoubtedly been more 
upbeat than at any time since 2009, when the international community failed to reach an 
DJUHHPHQW LQ&RSHQKDJHQ2SWLPLVPLV WKHZRUGRQHYHU\RQH¶V OLSV: from Greenpeace to Al 
Gore1. A key source of optimism is the deal struck by China and the United States in late 2014, 
which signalled their agreement to cooperate on developing clean energy and mitigating 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The US pledged to cut net emissions by 26-28 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2025. This represents a doubling of present ambition; it would take 
average annual emission reductions from 1.2 percent between 2005-2020, to 2.3-2.8 percent 
between 2020 and 2025. It is also significantly more ambitious than the targets taken by the US 
to Copenhagen, which was even weaker than the target it agreed in Kyoto in 1997. China 
pledged that CO2 emissions ZRXOGSHDNDURXQGµwith the intention to try to peak early¶, 
                                                        
1  http://www.rtcc.org/2015/01/26/us-top-climate-lawyer-overcoming-the-firewall/ consulted March 2015; 
http://www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-do/news-and-blogs/iea-chief-economist-optimistic-about-paris-climate-
summit/, consulted March 2015; http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/dec/23/2015-climate-
sceptics-us-china-agreement-carbon-emissions, consulted March 2015; http://cleantechnica.com/2015/01/25/al-
gore-optimistic-paris-exclusive-videos/, consulted March 2015. 
and that the non-fossil fuel share of all energy would increase to around 20 percent by 20302. 
This deal was widely seen as a breakthrough in climate change politics. China and the US 
together account for about 35% of global emissions3. Ambitious cuts from these two countries 
are undeniably important if we are to limit global warming to 2° Celsius. While this deal may 
reflect unprecedented ambition from these two countries, it is still far from the level of 
ambition that is needed. Nevertheless, the significance of the US-China deal can be measured 
in terms of its diplomatic impact as well as its impact on global emissions. The diplomatic 
importance of this deal chimes with dominant perspectives on the role of leadership in 
breaking the global warming gridlock4 . It is widely accepted in the scholarly and policy 
communities that leadership by major emitters will be essential for achieving a multilateral 
agreement. UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres praised the deal predicting that 
it would provide a strong push in negotiations and encourage others to follow suit. Echeverría 
DQG*DVVREVHUYHG WKDW WKHGHDOZDV VLJQLILFDQW LUUHVSHFWLYHRI WKH OHYHO RI DPELWLRQ µ«Whe 
fact that these two countries have not only committed to targets, but have done so in a 
collaborative manner, is a seismic shift in international climate policy dynamics¶ 5 . This 
GHYHORSPHQW DOVR UHVRQDWHV ZLWK WKH ZLGHVSUHDG SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW EUHDNLQJ WKH µJULGORFN¶ LQ
international climate change politics is most likely to be achieved in exclusive µPLQLODWHUDO¶
forums. The idea of minilateralism slowly gathered momentum throughout the 2000s and 
struck a chord with many frustrated observers in the aftermath of Copenhagen. Moisés Naím, 
for example, XUJHG WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ WR DEDQGRQ LWV µIODZHG REVHVVLRQ ZLWK
PXOWLODWHUDOLVP¶ DQG LQVWHDG µEULQJ to the table the smallest possible number of countries 
QHHGHG WR KDYH WKH ODUJHVW SRVVLEOH LPSDFW RQ VROYLQJ D SDUWLFXODU SUREOHP¶6. Reducing the 
number of parties to a negotiation would, it is argued, reduce complexity and the likelihood of 
stalemate and thereby offers the greatest FKDQFHRIRYHUFRPLQJWKHµLPSDVVH¶LQJOREDOFOLPDWH
politics7. Shifting negotiations from the inclusive multilateral forum of the UNFCCC to small 
clubs of the major emitters (like the Major Economies Forum, or the bilateral China-India 
dialogue) would reduce the number of compromises required to accommodate the needs and 
interests of 196 parties.  
Viewed from these perspectives of leadership and minilateralism, the US-China deal is 
a positive sign and bodes well for Paris. While the international community has yet to abandon 
ideals of multilateralism, there is reason to believe that some agreement in Paris is more likely 
once the major emitters have reached common understandings and commitments. The problem 
                                                        
2 THE WHITE HOUSE, «Factsheet: U.S.-China joint announcement on climate change and clean energy 
cooperation», 11 November 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-
joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c  
3 N. HÖHNE, H. FEKETE, M. HAGEMANN, K. WOUTERS, B. HARE, M. SCHAEFFER, F. SFERRA, M. 
LINDBERG, L. JEFFERY, M. ROCHA, C. BAXTER. «China and the US: how does their climate action 
compare?»  Climate Action Tracker Policy Brief, 21 October 2014.  
4 C. KARLSSON, C. PARKER, M. HJERPE, and B.O. LINNÉR. 2011. «Looking for Leaders: Perceptions of 
Climate Change Leadership among Climate Change Negotiation Participants», Global Environmental Politics 
11(1): 89-107; C.F. PARKER, C. KARLSSON, and M. HJERPE, «Climate change leaders and followers: 
Leadership recognition and selection in the UNFCCC negotiations», International Relations. Forthcoming, DOI: 
10.1177/0047117814552143.  
5  D. ECHEVERRÍA and P. GASS, «7KH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG &KLQD¶V 1HZ &OLPDWH &KDQJH &RPPLWPHQWV
Elements, implications and reactions», IISD Briefing Note. International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
November 2014, p.3. 
6 M. 1$Ë0³0LQLODWHUDOLVP´Foreign Policy, 2009, July/August (173), p.137; D.G. VICTOR, Global Warming 
Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011.  
7 M. GRASSO, and J. TIMMONS ROBERTS, «A compromise to break the climate impasse», Nature Climate 
Change 8 June 2014. Vol. 4. Pp.543-49; D.G. VICTOR 2011; B.E. BAGOZZI «The multifaceted nature of global 
climate change negotiations», forthcoming, Review of International Organizations͒  DOI 10.1007/s11558-014-
9211-7.  
with this pragmatic line of thinking is that it assumes that any agreement is a progressive step 
forward. Indeed, scholars and practitioners of international relations are often guilty of 
measuring the success of an international regime only in terms of whether an agreement has 
been reached, and whether the signatories subsequently comply. The question of whether the 
agreement will successfully mitigate the problem it purports to address is of secondary 
concern8. This tendency was displayed in the final hours and aftermath of the Copenhagen 
climate summit. The derision directed at the small number of states who thwarted adoption of 
the final text was generally stronger than the criticism directed at the powerful few who 
covertly drafted it9. While there may be good reasons to question the motives of all of these 
GLVVHQWLQJ SDUWLHV WKH VXEVWDQFH RI WKHLU GLVVHQW ZDV HQWLUHO\ UHDVRQDEOH %ROLYLD¶V FKLHI
negotiator rejected the unambitious 2° target on the grounds that it would endanger islands, 
coastal cities, and the water and food security of millions of people10. Tuvalu similarly rejected 
how ambition was being traded off for financial aid11. Of course, it now seems very unlikely 
that warming will be limited to even 2°. For those dissenting parties, and for many within civil 
society, the failure to reach agreement was deplorable, but no agreement was preferable to a 
grossly insufficient one. 
This article departs from pragmatic tone of mainstream discussion on climate change 
negotiations. Drawing on green political theory, it approaches climate change as part of a wider 
condition of unsustainability. This perspective cautions against assuming that any agreement is 
a progressive step forward. This article proceeds by establishing a standard for assessing the 
quality of any international agreement on climate change. This is based on an account of 
ecological rationality and ecological reflexivity, concepts which are explained in the following 
section. Subsequent sections then use this standard to assess the quality of global climate 
governance firstly during the ten-year period of 1997-2007, and then in more recent efforts to 
negotiate a new international agreement. What this discussion reveals is profound ecological 
irrationality and an absence of ecological reflexivity.  
 
ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND REFLEXIVITY 
Rather than assume that any international agreement on climate change is a step forward, the 
content of proposed agreements ought to be subjected to a test of ecological rationality. 
³5DWLRQDOLW\´FDQEHFRQFHSWXDOL]HGLQWHUPVRIfoci and form. Baber and Bartlett identify three 
different foci to which the concept of rationality can be applied: the system, the choice or 
action, and the reasoning process12: 
1. Functional rationality applies to the level of the system. ³7KH IXQFWLRQDO UDWLRQDOLW\ RI D
system is the degree to which system behavior is organized according to particular 
principles DQG FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG E\ UHIHUHQFH WR SULQFLSOHV RI RUGHU´ 13 . A system is 
IXQFWLRQDOO\UDWLRQDOLILWLVRUJDQL]HGWR³FRQVLVWHQWO\DQGHIIHFWLYHO\promote or produce 
VRPHYDOXH´14.  
                                                        
8  G. KÜTTING, Environment, Society and International Relations: Towards More effective International 
Environmental Agreements. London: Routledge, 2000. 
9 H. STEVENSON, «Representing Green Radicalism: the limits of state-based representation in global climate 
governance». Review of International Studies, 2014, 40, p.178. 
10 UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Pro- ͒ tocol (CMP) 
resumed 12th Meeting, Copenhagen (19 December 2009), Plenary. 03:10 CET.  
http:// www1.cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme= 
unfccc&id_kongresssession=2755  
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8422031.stm consulted January 2010. 
12  W.F. BABER and R.V. BARTLETT, Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and Ecological 
Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 
13 Ibidem, p.17. 
14 J.S. DRYZEK. Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, p.25. 
2. Substantive rationality applies to the level of the choice or action. Choices and actions can 
EHGHVFULEHGDVUDWLRQDOLIWKH\DSSHDUWREH³DSSURSULDWHWRWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIJLYHQJRDOV
within the limits imposed by givHQFRQGLWLRQVDQGFRQVWUDLQWV´15.  
3. Procedural rationality applies to the level of the reasoning process. ³%HKDYLor is 
SURFHGXUDOO\ UDWLRQDO ZKHQ LW LV WKH RXWFRPH RI DSSURSULDWH GHOLEHUDWLRQ´ UDWKHU WKDQ
merely impulse16.  
 
In addition to these three foci, there are numerous forms to which the concept of rationality can 
be applied: technical, economic, social, legal, political, and ecological rationality. These forms 
of rationality can be found at all levels of focus: functional, substantive, and procedural. 
Dominant conceptualizations of rationality concern a single focus (choice or action) and two 
related forms (technical and economic). There is a pervasive assumption, especially in 
mainstream theories of international relations, that instrumental rationality (based on principles 
of efficiency and utility-maximization) is universally inherent to individuals prior to any social 
interaction. A commitment to this understanding of rationality effectively rules out the 
possibility that actors may reason about ends as well as means; instrumental rationality is 
concerned with achieving pre-given goals, irrespective of the desirability of those goals. 
Specific manifestations of rationality at any time and place are essentially socially constructed, 
rather than natural, universal, and inevitable. Some forms of rationality may be highly 
problematic and inappropriate in certain contexts.  
Green political theory usefully reminds us that socially constructed forms of rationality 
can effect harm not only on particular groups within society, but also on the nonhuman natural 
world 17 . An ecocentric position denaturalizes the anthropocentrism that is embedded in 
instrumenWDOUDWLRQDOLW\$QWKURSRFHQWULVPLVGHILQHGE\(FNHUVOH\DV³WKHEHOLHIWKDWWKHUHLVD
clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature, that 
humankind is the only or principal source of value and meaning in the world, and that 
nonhuman nature is there for no other pXUSRVH EXW WR VHUYH KXPDQNLQG´18. This position is 
based on a distinction between humans and nature, which green political theorists reject on the 
basis that it is an ontological fallacy and/or environmentally damaging19. In contrast to this 
distinction, ecocentrism is based on an undeUVWDQGLQJ RI ³LQWHUQDO UHODWHGness, according to 
which all organisms are not simply interrelated with their environment but also constituted by 
those very environmental inter-UHODWLRQVKLSV´ 20 . Dryzek reminds us that the onus of 
establishing and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with nature necessarily falls on 
humans, because nature can exist without humankind, yet humankind cannot exist without 
nature21 7KLV VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH FRQFHSW RI ³HFRORJLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\´ VKRXOG EH EDVHG RQ WKH
overarching goal of establishing and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with 
nature. Rather than assuming that the goals of efficiency and utility-maximization are inherent 
to human nature, the identification of such goals can be treated as a normative exercise. Given 
that the conditions for sustained human life are dependent on a healthy environment, our 
                                                        
15 H.A. SIMON, «From Substantive to Procedural Rationality». In Method and Appraisal in Economics, ed. S.J. 
LATSIS. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.130. 
16 Ibidem, p.131. 
17 e.g. R. ECKERSLEY 1992 Environmentalism and Political Theory. Albany: State University of New York 
Press; R. ECKERSLEY. 2004, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press; DRYZEK, Rational Ecology, op. cit.; V. PLUMWOOD, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason, London: Routledge, 2002; V. PLUMWOOD, «Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental 
Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism». Hypatia 1991, 6(1), pp.3±28. 
18 ECKERSLEY, Environmentalism and Political Theory, op. cit., p.51. 
19 Idem. 
20 Ibidem, p.49. 
21 DRYZEK, Rational Ecology, op. cit. 
overarching goal should be the maintenance of a healthy environment. As Plumwood argues, 
even if we take a minimally anthropocentric approach and value sustained human life, it is 
essential that ecological rationality be constructed and prioritized over other forms of 
rDWLRQDOLW\³,IIRUPVRf rationality that treat the earth as plunder . . . have become a danger to 
us and to the rest of the inhabitants of the earth, we need to . . . develop new forms. These will 
be ecologically sensitive forms of rationality that judge what currently passes for reason by the 
standards of ecological success oUIDLOXUHDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJV´22. 
This green theoretical background allows us to identify how ecological rationality 
manifests at each of the three levels of focus identified earlier: 
 
1. The system: A system or organization would be ecologically rational if it is organized in 
VXFK D ZD\ WKDW LW FRXOG ³FRQVLVWHQWO\ DQG HIIHFWLYHO\« provide the good of human life 
VXSSRUW´23. Baber and Bartlett suggest that such a system would be organized according to 
a fundamentDOSULQFLSOHRI³ELRJHRSK\VLFDOLQWHUGHSHQGHQFH´24.  
2. Choice or action: Individual and collective choices and action would be ecologically 
rational if they could be judged as appropriate to the goal of achieving and maintaining a 
mutually supportive relationship with the biosphere.  
3. 5HDVRQLQJSURFHVV$QHFRORJLFDOO\UDWLRQDOUHDVRQLQJSURFHVVZRXOGHQWDLOD³KLJKHU-order 
form of critical, prudential, self-critical reason which scrutinizes the match or fit between 
DQ DJHQW¶V FKRLFHV DFWLRQV DQG HIIHFWV DQG WKDW DJHQW¶V RYHUDOO GHVLUHV LQWHUHVWV DQG
objectives as they require certain ecological conditions for their fulfilOPHQW´25. 
 
A pre-condition for realizing ecological rationality is reflexivity, involving thinking 
about, reflecting on, and monitoring individual and social behavior, as well as responding to 
new knowledge and information in ways that reinforce or transform that behavior. Social 
theorists, most prominently Anthony Giddens, have shown how reflexivity is intrinsic to 
human activity26. 2¶%ULHQ points out that as an inherent human capacity, reflexivity has no 
SDUWLFXODU SROLWLFDO TXDOLW\ ³UHIOH[LYH PRQLWRULQJ RI FRQGXFW´ FDQ MXVW DV HDVLO\ UHSURGXFH
feudalism and dictatorship as it can transform those systems into something more progressive. 
There is nothing inherently transformative about basic human reflexivity27 . For Giddens, 
however, there is something unique about modern reflexivity as a post-traditional form of 
reflexivity. The scale of knowledge and information available in modern societies means that 
reflexivity takes on a redefining function whereby human activity is regularly reordered as a 
result of self-monitoring28 *LGGHQV UHIHUV WR WKLV DV WKH LQWHQVLILFDWLRQ RI UHIOH[LYLW\ ³7KH
reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly 
examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus 
FRQVWLWXWLYHO\DOWHULQJWKHLUFKDUDFWHU´29. Human relations with non-human nature ought to be a 
domain that benefits IURPWKLVµLQWHQVLILHG¶H[DPLQDWLRQRIVRFLDODFWLRQThe fact that climate 
change was taken up as an issue of political concern in the 1980s is evidence of some degree 
and form of reflexivity. At this time, political leaders and concerned citizens began to reflect 
on the connections between scientific evidence of global warming and dominant development 
                                                        
22 PLUMWOOD, Environmental Culture, op. cit., p.18. 
23 Ibedem., p.25. 
24 Ibedem, p.19. 
25 Ibedem, p.68. 
26 A. GIDDENS, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, 1991. Cambridge: Polity 
Press; M. Archer, Making our Way through the World, 2007, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
27 02¶%5,(1«Theorising Modernity: Reflexivity, identity and environment in GLGGHQV¶VRFLDOWKHRU\ª,Q0
2¶%5,(163(11$DQG&+$<HGVTheorising Modernity. 1999. London: Longman. p. 25. 
28 Ibidem, pp.25-6. 
29 A. GIDDENS, The Consequences of Modernity, 1990, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.38. 
paths, and subsequently established a multilateral process to coordinate a response30. However, 
in the following sections I demonstrate how this response has reflected only a very weak form 
of ecological reflexivity, and has ultimately produced ecologically irrational outcomes. It 
remains beyond the scope of this article to develop a full account of an ecologically rational 
system for addressing climate change (i.e., the focus of functional rationality). Instead, I limit 
my attention to assessing the substantive rationality of global climate governance under the 
first 10 years of the Kyoto Protocol, and the procedural rationality of more recent efforts to 
craft a future international agreement.  
 
INSTITUTIONALISING UNSUSTAINABILITY: 1997-2007  
The experience of the Kyoto Protocol should serve as a caution against assuming that any 
international agreement on climate change is a step forward. If we apply an ecological standard 
of substantive rationality to this agreement, its shortcomings are readily exposed. A choice or 
action can be considered ecologically rational if it advances the goal of achieving and 
maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with the biosphere. Far from advancing this 
goal, the Kyoto Protocol induced states to comply with climate governance norms in ways that 
actually exacerbate unsustainable development. Elsewhere I offer a full account of this 
process31. Here I will focus on the significance of shifting understandings about how climate 
change mitigation should be pursued.  
As climate change climbed up the political agenda in the 1980s and 1990s, negotiations 
were underpinned by a widely shared assumption that mitigation should be pursued through 
domestic emission reduction targets32. Perhaps as a consequence of its institutionalization in 
two existing international atmospheric agreements (the Montreal Protocol and the European 
Community¶V /DUJH &RPEXVWLRQ 3ODQW 'LUHFWLYH WKLV QRUP ZDV UHIOHFWHG LQ QXPHURXV
declarations and policies in the lead up to the creation of the UNFCCC in 1992. But norms are 
not static; they evolve through contestation and reinterpretation. Throughout the 1990s, the 
dominant interpretation of this norm shifted as global environmental governance came to be 
PRUHEURDGO\GRPLQDWHGE\DGLVFRXUVHRIµOLEHUDOHQYLURQPHQWDOLVP¶33. As Bernstein explains, 
µWKH ³compromLVH RI OLEHUDO HQYLURQPHQWDOLVP´ mitigates the economic disruptions that 
environmental protection may cause by absorbing environmental concerns into the liberal 
economic order itself; environmental protection has thus become seemingly dependent on 
securing continued economic growth and accumulation¶34. This allowed attention to gradually 
shift from domestic mitigation efforts to transnational ones. The Kyoto Protocol 
institutionalized the idea that mitigation should be pursued via domestic targets, but in a 
compromised form that directed attention away fURPLQGXVWULDOL]HGVWDWHV¶H[LVWLQJHPLVVLRQV
to the future emissions of developing countries. In contrast to earlier environmental and 
atmospheric agreePHQWV WKH .\RWR 3URWRFRO WLHG GRPHVWLF WDUJHWV WR D VHW RI µIOH[LEOH
PHFKDQLVPV¶ that would enable states to meet their commitments in the most cost-efficient 
manner by investing in GHG mitigation in less-developed countries, or buying emissions 
credits through a trading system. 
Shifting attention from domestic mitigation efforts to transnational ones, and tying 
mitigation to flexible mechanisms institutionalized a technical representation of the climate 
change problem. Viewed through a technical lens, the specific sources of emissions, as well as 
                                                        
30 H. STEVENSON, Institutionalizing Unsustainability: The Paradox of Global Climate Governance, 2013, 
Berkley: University of California Press, chapter 2. 
31 Idem. 
32 Ibidem, pp.23-5. 
33  S. BERNSTEIN, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, 2001, New York: Colombia University 
͒ Press. 
34 Idem. 
the social and political objectives they serve, are treated as irrelevant: avoiding dangerous 
climate change simply requires limiting overall global emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
global climate governance became a task principally of mitigating GHG emissions at the 
cheapest possible source, rather than one of transforming the political, economic, and cultural 
drivers of excessive emissions.  
The fundamental problem with these flexible mechanisms is that they introduce 
³UHPRWHQHVV´LQWRJOREDOFOLPDWHJRYHUQDQFHThis refers WRWKHGLVUXSWLRQRI³FRQQHFWLRQVDnd 
balances between decisions and their consequenFHV´35. Essentially this serves to obstruct the 
SRVVLELOLW\RIHFRORJLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\'LVWDQFHVHYHUVµecological and social feedback as decision 
points along the (commodity) chain are increasingly separated along the dimensions of 
geography, culture, agency, and power¶36. Remoteness manifests in several forms, the most 
obvious one being spatial: the spatial distance between practices of production and 
consumption disassociates people from the ecological consequences of their choices. However, 
there are other forms of remoteness that artificially disassociate people from the ecological 
relationships in which they are embedded; these include consequential, communicative, 
epistemic, temporal, and technological remoteness37. If we were to only address the spatial 
form of remoteness (for example, by localizing economic and political processes), these other 
forms of remoteness would continue to obstruct ecological rationality.  
While several countries withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, many others were able to 
fully comply with their targets by relying on emissions offsetting. As the birthplace of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Japan may appear to offer some hope for environmental leadership. But in 
2006 Japan became the largest purchaser of offset credits on the international market38. The EU 
initially opposed the flexible mechanisms but later became their most ardent supporter39. Under 
WKH(8¶VHPLVVLRQVWUDGLQJVFKHPHVHFWRUVFDQPHHWXSWR percent of their targets through 
the purchase of carbon offsets. Sectors outside the trading scheme, including transport, 
buildings, agriculture, and waste, can meet 73 percent of their reduction target through 
offsets40. This simply allows carbon-intensive development to continue. 
In sum, by inducing wealthy states to offset their ecologically insensitive policies, 
practices, and systems in distant, poorer states, global climate governance under the Kyoto 
Protocol simply served to reinforce existing unsustainability.  
 
THE PATH FROM BALI TO COPENHAGEN: 2007-2009 
In 2008, the international community met on the Indonesian island of Bali to launch a new 
process for negotiating future climate change agreements. With the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol nearing a close, it was time to secure commitments on a second 
commitment period, as well develop an agreement that would include those Parties with 
PLQLPDO RU QR .\RWR REOLJDWLRQV 7KH UHVXOWLQJ ³%DOL $FWLRQ 3ODQ´ established a two-track 
process to advance these objectives. One track, the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), had a broad scope encompassing debate on a long-term 
shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, finance, and technology. This process provides an 
opportunity for assessing the procedural rationality of more recent processes of global climate 
governance. It is this process that culminated in the COP15 summit which produced the highly 
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inadequate Copenhagen Accord. However, rather than focus on the substance of this agreement 
itself, my aim in this section is to assess its preceding reasoning processes against a standard of 
ecological rationality. To recall, an ecologically rational reasoning process would entail critical 
scrutLQ\RIµWKHPDWFKRUILWEHWZHHQDQDJHQW¶VFKRLFHVDFWLRQVDQGHIIHFWVDQG WKDWDJHQW¶V
overall desires, interests and objectives as they require certain ecological conditions for their 
IXOILOOPHQW¶41. Green political theorists persuasively argue that such scrutiny is more likely to 
emerge from inclusive deliberation, rather than acting on impulse or aggregating individuals 
preliminary preferences.42  'HOLEHUDWLRQ FDQ EH GHILQHG DV µGHEDWH DQG GLVFXVVLRQ DLPHG DW
producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise 
preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. 
Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected 
to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as 
justification to all affected) idealO\FKDUDFWHUL]HVGHOLEHUDWLRQ¶43.  
While it may be unreasonable to expect multilateral negotiations to conform to a 
theoretical ideal of deliberation, there are certainly deliberative practices and qualities that are 
compatible with the theory and practice of negotiations 44 . One of these is the inclusive 
engagement of diverse discourses, or perspectives. Deliberation and decision-making in 
enclave-like environments is very unlikely to produce ecologically rational outcomes. 
Arguments advanced in groups of like-minded individuals are shielded from critique and 
challenge. The result can be what Sunstein UHIHUV WR DV µLGHRORJLFDO DPSOLILFDWLRQ¶ whereby 
people reinforce their commitment to existing convictions when they are supported by a vocal 
majority45. This diminishes reflexive capacity.  
Debates in public settings surrounding the Bali Action Plan negotiating process (2008-
2009) certainly featured diverse discourses 46 . These can be classified as Mainstream 
Sustainability; Expansive Sustainability; Limits; and Green Radicalism47. These vary, in part, 
according to the extent to which they take existing political-economic conditions for granted, 
or subject them to ecological scrutiny.  
x Mainstream Sustainability assumes that climate change action can be defined within the 
parameters of the existing liberal capitalist system. The drive to compete and 
accumulate material goods and wealth is taken to be an inherent aspect of human nature 
and relations. But low-FDUERQFDSLWDOLVPDQGµJUHHQJURZWK¶DUHYLDEOHRSWLRQVEHFDXVH
pollution and profit can be decoupled. Market logic or governmental policy and 
regulation can align goals of economic growth with the demands of ecological 
sustainability. This may involve emissions trading or carbon taxes, voluntary or 
mandatory sectoral standards, and strong intellectual property rights regimes.  
x Expansive Sustainability holds to many of the same assumptions as its mainstream 
counterpart. Decarbonised economic development is possible, and profit and pollution 
can be decoupled. But here there is an emphasis on directing economic modernisation 
towards the fulfilment of human needs and mitigating North-South inequalities rather 
than just mitigating GHG emissions in the most efficient manner. This may require 
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carefully designed market mechanisms, and concessionary transfer of clean technology 
from North to South.  
x Limits questions both the ecological viability and social desirability of neoliberal 
development; unlimited economic growth is criticised, as is profligate consumption and 
unconstrained population growth. The economic system is considered in need of 
significant restructuring, but there is trust in the capacity of existing authorities (e.g., 
JRYHUQPHQWVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQVRIYROXQWDU\µGRZQVL]LQJ¶WRDFKLHYHWKLV 
x Green Radicalism calls into the question the ecological viability of capitalism and 
growth-based economies, as well as the capacity of existing authorities to promote the 
systemic change required. It calls for a redistribution of power towards local 
communities and marginalised groups, and shift towards prioritising human rights, 
justice, and equity over short-term growth concerns. Industrial-scale production is 
rejected in favor of small-scale development. Market-based mechanisms are rejected on 
the grounds that they shift responsibility and have contributed to environmental crises 
in the first place.  
 
These diverse discourses were articulated in civil society forums, blogs, business summits, and 
UNFCCC side events. Transmission from these settings to the formal negotiations during 
2008-2009 was very weak. Mainstream Sustainability was strongly represented, particularly in 
statements from the EU, US, and Japan. The G77 bloc of developing countries frequently 
articulated equity concerns, albeit in a narrow state-centric vein that overlooks intra-state 
inequalities or empowering local communities. Venezuela made occasional critical references 
to capitalism, and Bolivia consistently advanced a Green Radical position48. In short, reformist 
voices are prominent, but radical ones are barely heard. What has been entirely absent is any 
thorough engagement with WKRVH TXHVWLRQLQJ VWDWHV¶ WDNHQ-for-granted interests and goals. 
:KDW 6WHYHQ %HUQVWHLQ FDOOV WKH µFRPSURPLVH RI OLEHUDO HQYLURQPHQWDOLVP¶ UHPDLQV EH\RQG
scrutiny.  
Insofar as certain agendas remain beyond debate, reflexivity is suppressed and 
ecological rationality is impossible. It may be the case that proponents of Limits and Green 
Radicalism are wrong. Irrespective of whether they are right or wrong, there are rational 
justifications for engaging them in deliberation. The process of critically scrutinising existing 
political and economic objectives in light of the latest sustainability science is precisely what is 
demanded for ecologically rational procedures. This involves critical reflection of existing 
goals rather than just the means to achieve those goals. Designing climate change policy by 
reconciling it with existing development goals reflects a highly constrained form of reflexivity. 
Engaging in deliberation with those who question these goals may not produce either 
FRQVHQVXVRUµUDGLFDOJUHHQ¶DJUHHPHQWVEXWLWZRXOGRSHQVSDFHIRUFRQVLGHULQJZKLFKDVSHFWV
of our existing political and economic structures are implicated in the problem of climate 
change and broader conditions of unsustainability. It is now commonplace to dismiss as a 
µP\WK¶WKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWH[SRQHQWLDOHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGVustainability are incompatible49. 
But given the strength of evidence surrounding (a) the limits of dematerialisation, and (b) the 
limited connection between material accumulation and human wellbeing, there are good 
ecological and social reasons for taking a less dismissive position. On the question of 
dematerialisation, technological optimists and mainstream economists are quick to point out 
that economic growth in industrialized countries has been largely decoupled from energy 
consumption and GHG emissions. If material output is decreasingly dependent on natural 
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resources there is no imperative to curb growth. Indeed, efficiency standards have improved 
dramatically in recent decades: on a global scale energy intensity was 33 percent lower in 2008 
than in 197050. But from a sustainability perspective, relative decoupling is far less relevant 
than absolute decoupling. In other words, we need to reduce the amount of resources that are 
being used rather than just reduce the rate at which they are being used. Here, the figures are 
less positive. Between 1990 and 2008, global GDP grew at a faster rate than GHG emissions, 
but emissions still grew by forty percent. In OECD countries, emissions grew by only 4 
percent in the 1990s, while GDP grew by 23 percent51. But this data omits the emissions 
embodied in goods imported for domestic consumption. When these are taken into account, the 
consumption and economic growth in wealthy countries is shown to be highly emissions-
intensive 52  (Peters and Hertwich 2008). Given the emissions intensity of growth-based 
development patterns, it is worth recalling their weak relationship with human wellbeing. 
Economic indicators, including GDP and surpluses and deficits are prominent indicators of 
progress and wellbeing. But studies consistently suggest that above a certain level, wealth and 
consumption is inversely related to human wellbeing53 . In any case, the ends of private 
procurement can often easily be met through alternative sharing-based arrangements. An 
important body of literature is emerging that denormalises growth and dispels any ideas that a 
growth-centred model of progress is timeless and universal54 . As Ferguson REVHUYHV µthe 
commitment to growth is a relatively recent, novel and hence not necessarily permanent feature 
RI WKH JOREDO SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\¶55. Hegemonic ideas do change, but there are no assurances 
that the rate of change will be sufficiently swift to avoid some very grim social and ecological 
outcomes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Charting a course towards a more sustainable future will require applying a stringent standard 
of ecological rationality to any agreement that governments manage to reach at the Paris 
climate summit or beyond. Agreements that give a veneer of progress while reinforcing 
unsustainable conditions or placing certain questions beyond the realm of debate are no cause 
for celebration. 7R GDWH JOREDO FOLPDWH FKDQJH SROLWLFV KDV IHDWXUHG D µOLJKW JUHHQ¶ IRUP RI
reflexivity: the environmental problems associated with industrial development are recognized 
and attention is directed to identifying more sustainable means of reaching existing goals. A 
deeper ecological reflexivity is required if the international community is to bring human and 
economic development into line with an overarching goal of achieving and maintaining a 
mutually supportive relationship with the biosphere. This will require critical scrutiny of the 
µOLEHUDOHQYLURQPHQWDOLVW¶DJHQGDDQGUHIOHFWLRQRQWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUPRYLQJEH\RQGJURZWK-
centric models of development.   
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